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BASIC OBJECTS AS GROUNDS: A METAPHYSICAL 
MANIFESTO 
BILL BREWER 
 
 
Introduction 
 
According to our commonsense world-view, macroscopic material objects 
endure, are never precisely collocated with each other, and may survive the loss 
of at least some of their parts. But these commitments are notoriously difficult to 
reconcile.1 My project in what follows is to elaborate an account that succeeds in 
reconciling them in the most basic cases, of what I call Natural Continuants, and 
to explore its potential as an adequate overall theory by explaining how such 
basic objects may serve as the grounds for various other material things.2  
 
§1 Endurance, Exclusivity, and Natural Continuants 
 
                                                        
1 See §§2&3 below for the brief presentation of two well-known problem cases to 
which the rejection of Endurance and the rejection of Exclusivity are in each case 
the two most popular solutions. See my (2017) for extended discussion of the 
first problem and my (2015) for similar discussion of the second problem. 
2 An alternative response would be to reject the commonsense world-view right 
away. This would over-hasty. Our commonsense commitments are at least a 
constraint on metaphysical theorizing. They may have to be revised or rejected 
at the end of the day; but it is in my view an over-reaction to abandon them at 
first sign of any trouble. Although I cannot develop the point here, this is at least 
in part because they play an indispensible preliminary role in demarcating the 
subject matter for metaphysical scrutiny. 
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It is a non-trivial undertaking to give a clear, precise, neutral, and uncontentious 
characterization of the persistence of ordinary objects by Endurance. Here I rely 
on the familiar framing idea that this is persistence through a period of time by 
their being wholly present at every time in that period rather than by having for 
each such time a distinct temporal part. I understand Exclusivity as the following 
condition: for all x and all y, if there is a time at which x and y are precisely 
collocated, then x=y. To say that persisting material things of a given kind are 
Exclusive is to say that Exclusivity holds on the domain of objects of that kind. 
 
According to the Natural Continuants View, (NCV), there are Enduring and 
Exclusive Natural Continuants (NCs), that are wholly naturally unified, both at a 
time and over time, entirely independent of our concepts; these ground non-
Enduring and non-Exclusive quasi-processive Artificial Continuants (ACs) by 
various modes of conceptual abstraction, paradigmatically spatial partition, 
temporal partition, role collection, plural analogues of the last two of these and 
perhaps also further iteration of all of them. In order to proceed, I simply register 
my conviction that the Natural Continuants include individual animals, plants, 
and integrated portions of various materials. 
 
What follows is a preliminary attempt to articulate principles according to which 
macroscopic material things may be categorized according to (NCV), to explain 
how certain familiar issues in the area are therefore to be addressed, and to 
elaborate the central features of the overall position. The bulk of the work 
concerns the various modes of conceptual abstraction involved in the grounding 
of ACs upon the basic ontology of NCs, thereby illustrating in some detail the role 
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of basic objects as grounds in the metaphysics of persisting material things. 
Cases of non-Endurance or non-Exlusivity all involve one or more ACs. 
 
§§2&3 concern spatial and temporal partition respectively; §4 concerns role 
collection; §5 concerns plural temporal partition, plural role collection, and 
iteration; §6 clarifies the relation between (NCV) and Fine’s theory of rigid and 
variable embodiment (1999); and §7 considers a principled objection to (NCV). I 
conclude in §8. 
 
§2 Spatial Partition 
 
Suppose that o is an NC and that the concept P identifies a relatively stable 
region within o. Then o’s P and o’s P-complement are AC’s grounded on o by 
spatial partition. 
 
An example would be the undetached tail-complement, Tib, of a cat, Tibbles. 
(NCV) therefore offers a straightforward solution to the problem of Tibbles’ 
survival of the loss of his tail at time t. The problem is as follows. Suppose that 
Tibbles’ tail is removed at time t. Surely Tibbles survives the loss and sits on the 
mat tailless after t. Equally surely, Tib remains on the mat after t too. For Tib is 
hardly touched by the removal of Tibbles’ tail. It is natural to assume that there is 
only one thing on the mat after t. Hence Tibbles must be (identical to) Tib. But 
this cannot be. Since Tib was a proper part of Tibbles and so they cannot be 
identical. According to (NCV), both Tibbles and Tib do indeed survive, precisely 
collocated from t. But this is consistent with the Exclusivity of NCs, since Tib is an 
 4 
AC grounded on the one NC Tibbles by spatial partition on the basis of the 
concept of a tail-complement.3 
 
I propose the following general principles governing an AC, (o, P), grounded on o 
by spatial partition on the basis of P. 
 
(o, P) exists at t iff P identifies a relatively stable region of o at t. 
                                                        
3 There are of course many alternative solutions on the market. Nihilists deny the 
existence of Tibbles and every other putative composite macroscopic thing, 
including of course Tib (Unger 1979, Dorr and Rosen 2002, Sider 2013). 
Microscopic metaphysical simples never compose. Talk of all composite ‘objects’ 
is to be paraphrased away as talk about the relevant simples arranged and 
behaving in certain ways. Near nihilists under the influence of Van Inwagen deny 
the existence of Tib. Simples only compose when they constitute a life. Talk of all 
inanimate composites is again to be paraphrased away (Van Inwagen 1990, 
Merricks, 2001). Mereological essentialists deny that Tibbles survives the loss of 
his tail. Nothing strictly survives the loss of any part – all its parts are essential – 
but it may be followed by a series of strictly distinct entia successiva that provide 
nearly-truth-makers of our commonsense talk of persisting things (Chisholm 
1973, 1975, Van Cleve, 1986). Michael Ayers (1991, vol. II, ch. 20) denies that Tib 
remains after t, presumably since Tib is supposed essentially to be a proper part 
of Tibbles. Sortalists deny that there is only one thing on the mat after t. 
Determinately individuating a single persisting material object requires 
subsumption under a sortal concept; and this may lead to the distinction 
between two or more such things in the same place at the same time, such as 
Tibbles and Tib – one cat and one animal-part, say – both on the mat after t 
(Wiggins 1967, 1968, 1980, 2001, Thompson 1998). Relativists insist that 
identity itself is relative to a sortal concept. There are distinct non-extensionally-
equivalent identity relations that do not mix transitively (Geach 1967, 1973, 
1980, Griffin, 1977). What is on the mat after t may be the same cat as Tibbles 
and the same animal-part as Tib without contradicting the fact that Tibbles and 
Tib are not related by either the same-cat or the same-animal-part identity 
relation. Occasionalists insist that identity may be temporary and again therefore 
not simply transitive (Gallois 1998). Tib was not identical to Tibbles before t but 
is so after t. Four-dimensionalists invoke an ontology of distinct temporal parts 
composing temporally extended ‘worm’-like objects or spatio-temporal hunks 
(Quine 1950, 1960, Lewis 1986, 202-4; Heller 1984, 1990, Sider, 2001). Tibbles 
and Tib are distinct such things, although they share all their post-t temporal 
parts, since their pre-t temporal parts are all distinct: those of Tibbles strictly 
larger (by a tail) than those of Tib. See my (2017) for an extended discussion of 
the (NCV) solution and the qualifications that follow. 
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(o, P) is located at π at t iff π is in the region of o identified by P at t. 
(o’, P’)=(o, P) iff o’=o and P’=P. 
The mass of (o, P) at t is the extent of o’s mass in the region identified by P at t. 
The shape of (o, P) at t is the shape of the region of o identified by P at t. 
 
We have seen that ACs may be precisely collocated with NCs, e.g. Tib and Tibbles 
after t. This also happens in the case of NC proper parts of NCs, such as Tibbles’ 
top left incisor. The AC grounded on Tibbles by spatial partition on the basis of 
the concept of a top left incisor is collocated with an NC proper part of Tibbles, 
namely a particular naturally unified tooth.4 This situation is the exception 
rather than the rule, though. Furthermore, it is a consequence of (NCV) that an 
NC may not survive the loss of the complement of any of its NC proper parts. For 
suppose that p is an NC proper part of NC o and that o survives the loss at time t 
of the complement of p, p’: all of o except for p. Then o becomes precisely 
collocated with p, which remains unchanged, at t. Both o and p are NCs. Hence o 
= p by Exclusivity. Yet o ≠ p, since p is a proper part of o before t. This is a 
contradiction. So o may not survive the loss of p’ at t. If p’ is destroyed, then all 
that remains of o is the distinct proper part p. o itself is no more. I take this to be 
a substantive theoretical constraint upon the identification of genuine NCs.5 
 
                                                        
4 Other plausible cases of NC proper parts of NCs are certain organs of animals 
and the leaves and fruit of certain plants. 
5 It is clearly met in the case of the plausible examples of NC proper parts of NCs 
given so far: the teeth and certain organs of animals and the leaves and fruit of 
certain plants. The case of a human brain may appear more difficult for (NCV), 
especially in the context of certain views about personal identity; but I sketch 
how any further difficulties in this case should be met elsewhere (2017). 
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(NCV) therefore rejects the closure of NC status under complementation. The 
complement, p’, of an NC proper part, p, of an NC, o, it not itself necessarily an 
NC. For there are cases such as Tibbles’ incisor above in which an NC may 
survive the loss of an NC proper part. If Tibbles’ incisor-complement were also 
an NC, then this would be Tibbles’ survival of the loss of the complement of that 
NC proper part in contradiction with the constraint upon NC status just 
established. This failure of closure constitutes an important sense in which NCs 
are not mere composites of NCs: they are the basic objects of my title.6 
 
§3 Temporal Partition 
 
Suppose that o is an NC and that the concept F identifies a property or role that o 
has for some continuous period during its existence. Then o’s being F, is an AC 
grounded on o by temporal partition. 
 
An example would be the statue-shaped entity on my desk that came into 
existence when a lump of clay, Lumpl, was intentionally so-shaped by a sculptor, 
and would cease to exit if Lumpl were squashed into a ball. There is an NC on my 
desk that satisfies the predicate ‘x is s a statue’, namely Lumpl itself; but this 
existed before and would exist after the AC grounded on it in this way by 
temporal partition on the basis of the concept of a statue. The name ‘Goliath’ as 
used in generating a philosophical puzzle from such a case is therefore 
ambiguous. It may refer either to an NC, Lumpl, or to an AC that is permanently a 
                                                        
6 I return to this idea in §6 below. 
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statue and only temporarily precisely collocated with Lumpl. In any case, Lumpl 
is a single Enduring and Exclusive NC. 
 
I propose the following general principles governing an AC, [o, F], grounded on o 
by temporal partition on the basis of F. 
 
[o, F] exists at t iff Fo at t. 
[o, F] is located at π at t iff Fo at t and π is the region occupied by o at t. 
[o’, F’]=[o, F] iff o’=o and F’=F. 
The mass of [o, F] at t is the mass of o at t provided that Fo. 
The shape of [o, F] at t is the shape of o at t provided that Fo. 
 
We have seen that expanding our domain of NCs to include also the ACs 
grounded upon them by spatial and temporal partition undermines Exclusivity. 
Furthermore, these ACs exist at t just in case their grounding NC satisfies a 
relevant condition at t: having a region identified by the partitioning concept P in 
the case of spatial partition and satisfying the partitioning concept F in the case 
of temporal partition. So their persistence is a matter of their grounding NCs’ 
continued satisfaction of that condition. This gives them a non-Endurantist, 
quasi-processive nature, more akin to the rolling of a boulder or the running of 
an athlete than to the boulder or the athlete involved.7 (NCV) therefore induces a 
structure on the metaphysics of persisting material things. Exclusive and 
Enduring basic objects, the NCs, ground non-Exclusive and non-Enduring ACs. 
                                                        
7 See Steward (2015) and Brewer (2015) for further discussion of the 
persistence of individual processes. 
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This is the pattern that will be replicated through the modes of grounding by 
various other forms of conceptual abstraction that I consider in §§4&5. 
 
§4 Role Collection 
 
Suppose that o1 and o2 are NCs and that the concept R identifies a role that is 
played by o1 for some continuous period during its existence, T1, and then passed 
on to o2 for a further continuous period during its existence, T2. Then the R, or 
perhaps better, something’s being (the, or that) R, is an AC grounded on o1 and o2 
by role collection. 
 
An example would be the England rugby captain, or various players’ being the 
England rugby captain, where this is construed as an Dylan Hartley’s being 
England captain since 2016, preceded by Chris Robshaw’s being England captain 
2012-2015, preceded by …, where each of these is an AC grounded by temporal 
partition upon the NCs Dylan Hartley, Chris Robshaw, and so on, on the basis of 
the concept of being England rugby captain. The point, according to (NCV), is 
that, although there is nothing wrong with this individual, correctly construed as 
an AC unified by in part by our concepts of various roles in a team and game, it 
would be a serious error to regard it as belonging to the same metaphysical 
category as the various NC human beings upon which it is grounded in this way 
by role collection. For they are Enduring and Exclusive elements of the domain of 
basic objects that are wholly naturally unified, both at a time and over time, 
entirely independent of our concepts. This may not be an error easily made in 
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this case; but it may be the source of genuine philosophical puzzlement in what 
are by the lights of (NCV) precisely analogous cases a long the following lines. 
 
Suppose that I have a device that records the precise shape of any metal key that 
it placed in it. Having done so, it vaporizes the key and simultaneously creates a 
perfect duplicate. Two distinct NCs appear in this story: the original key-shaped 
piece of metal that enters the device and is destroyed, and the piece of metal that 
is created and leaves the device with the precise key-shape of the original. There 
is no third NC that entered and left the device intact, which must therefore be 
regarded as distinct from both, although precisely collocated with the original 
initially and precisely collocated with the duplicate finally. This way of thinking 
leads to the multiplication of non-Exclusive material objects supposedly on a 
metaphysical par with individual, naturally unified, animals, plants, and 
integrated portions material, yet also in some way dependent upon our concepts 
for their unity and individuation. We can instead ground an AC upon the two 
genuine NCs involved here by role collection on the basis of their shared capacity 
to open my front door. But we must recognize that this is an entity of a quite 
different nature and status from its two distinct grounding NCs. Its place in the 
world is delineated by concepts of lock operation and house entry. There is at 
each point in the story an NC that satisfies the predicate ‘x is a key to my house; 
but these are distinct pre- and post- device-activation. The former may have 
existed before it became key-shaped, and the latter may continue to exist too 
battered and bent to open my front door. Each is an Enduring element of an 
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Exclusive domain. They jointly ground an AC by role collection, whose unity at 
and over time is in contrast absolutely not independent of our concepts.8 
 
Role collections may be represented by a function CR from times to AC’s along 
the following lines. 
 
CR(t)=[o1, R] for all tT1 
CR(t)=[o2, R] for all tT2 
 
Similarly if R is passed on to further NC’s, or indeed returned to NC’s that played 
it previously, during subsequent periods. 
 
Then I propose the following general principles governing an AC, CR, grounded 
on NCs oi by role collection on the basis of R. 
 
CR exists at t iff CR(t) exists at t. 
CR is located at π at t iff CR(t) is located at π at t. 
CR’=CR iff CR’(t)=CR(t) for all t. 
The mass of CR at t is the mass of CR(t) at t. 
The shape of CR at t is the shape of CR(t) at t. 
                                                        
8 Proponents of (NCV) are likely to take an analogous view of various cases 
discussed in the literature on personal identity that involve psychological 
continuity between distinct human animals. For canonical references on the 
other side, according to which such cases may involve a person surviving a 
change in the human animal with which she is temporarily collocated, see Locke 
(1975, II.xxvii), Shoemaker (1970), Parfit (1971), Lewis (1976). Williams (1970), 
illuminates the force of both sides of the debate. Ayers (1991, vol. II, ch. 25) 
presents a powerful case for the (NCV) approach that mirrors the case of the key 
in the text in such scenarios. 
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Once again, and for similar reasons, expanding the domain of NCs to include role 
collections introduces failures of Exclusivity and a quasi-processive failure of 
Endurance. 
 
§5 Plural Temporal Partition and Plural Role Collection 
 
§5.1 Plural Temporal Partition 
 
Suppose that o1-on are NCs and that the concept  identifies a relation that o1-on 
stand in for some continuous period during their existence. Then the o1-on’s 
being  is an AC grounded on o1-on by plural temporal partition. 
 
An example would be Fine’s (1999) ham sandwich, composed of two particular 
pieces of bread and a particular piece of ham whilst and only whilst the ham is 
between the two pieces of bread, or perhaps a specific item of jewelry that is 
composed of three similar gold bands provided that they are made for each other 
to be worn together on a single wrist and are suitably spatially related to make 
this possible. 
 
I propose the following general principles governing an AC, [o1-on, ], grounded 
on o1-on by plural temporal partition on the basis of . 
 
[o1-on, ] exists at t iff o1-on stand in  at t. 
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[o1-on, ] is located at π at t iff o1-on stand in  at t and π is a region occupied at t 
by oi for some i=1-n. 
[o’1-om, ’]= [o1-on, ] iff m=n, o’i=oi for all i=1-n, and ’=. 
The mass of [o1-on, ] at t is the sum of the masses of o1-on at t provided that 
they stand in . 
The shape of [o1-on, ] at t is in general the shape of the region occupied by o1-on 
together at t provided that they stand in .9 
 
§5.2 Plural Role Collection 
 
Suppose 1o1-1on and 2o1-2on are NCs and that the concept  identifies a role that 
is played jointly by for 1o1-1on for some continuous period during their existence, 
T1, and then passed on to 2o1-2on for a further continuous period during their 
existence, T2. Then the , or perhaps better, somethings’ being (the, or that) , is 
an AC grounded on 1o1-1on and 2o1-2on by plural role collection. 
 
An example would be Fine’s (1999) car, realized by slightly differing collections 
of NC car parts being suitably assembled to function as a car over time, or 
perhaps a chess set realized by a given collection of 32 wooden pieces assembled 
and used for playing chess during T1 and then by a slightly different collection of 
                                                        
9 There may be no straightforward the delineation of the region taken up by a 
plurality taken together as intended here. Furthermore, since  may tolerate a 
certain degree of scattering of o1-on, as in the case of the jewelry when one band 
is separated, say, ‘the shape of [o1-on, ]’ may in some cases be ill defined. So I 
certainly do not mean this to be a precise specification of a unproblematic shape 
property for plural temporal partitions. 
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pieces performing the same role during T2 after a pawn has been lost or 
destroyed and replaced by a duplicate, say. 
 
Plural role collections may be represented by a function  from times to ACs 
along the following lines. 
 
(t)=[1o1-1on, ] for all tT1 
(t)=[2o1-2on, ] for all tT2 
 
Similarly if  is passed on to further NCss, or indeed returned to NCss that 
played it previously, during subsequent periods. 
 
Then I propose the following general principles governing an AC, , grounded 
on NCss io1-ion by plural role collection on the basis of . 
 
 exists at t iff (t) exists at t. 
 is located at π at t iff (t) is located at π at t. 
’= iff ’(t)= (t) for all t. 
The mass of  at t is the mass of (t) at t. 
The shape of  at t is the shape of (t) at t. 
 
Like ACs grounded by singular temporal partition and role collection, plural 
temporal partitions and role collections are non-Endurantist and quasi-
processive in their nature and persistence. Their existence through time depends 
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upon their grounding NCs’ continued satisfaction of a defining condition, or, in 
the latter case, alternatively, upon their passing it on to other NCss. And again, 
like their singular counterparts, expanding the domain of NCs to include plural 
temporal partitions and role collections introduces multiple failures of 
Exclusivity. For distinct such ACs may be grounded upon the same NCs on the 
basis of distinct relations and roles. 
 
§5.3 Iteration 
 
Given the many and varied ACs grounded in all of the ways set out so far, (NCV) 
may also recognize further ACs grounded upon these in turn by repeated 
iteration of these same modes of conceptual abstraction. An example would be a 
particular team of racing cars that is composed at any time of a given plurality of 
cars provided that they are similarly painted and competing cooperatively 
together to win races. Such cars may be sold on for personal use after a while 
and replaced by newer models in the team. So the team is a plural role collection 
of cars that are each individually plural role collections of their individual NC car 
parts. It is a nice question to which I do not know the answer whether any AC 
grounded by repeated iteration in this way may equally be construed as an AC 
grounded directly upon the basic NC parts involved by one of the modes of 
abstraction set out above. 
 
§6 Fine’s Embodiments 
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As we have already seen from my direct adoption of his two characteristic 
examples, of a ham sandwich and a car, ACs grounded upon NCs by plural 
temporal partition and by plural role collection according to (NCV) have a great 
deal in common with Fine’s rigid and variable embodiments respectively (see 
esp. his 1999 and the more general theory developed in his 2010). As a result, I 
claim that (NCV) inherits many of the great virtues of Fine’s theory of 
embodiment as an improvement upon anything available within standard 
mereology in accounting for the timeless and temporary parts of more or less 
complex assemblages of such things. My aim in the present section is to clarify 
the equally important differences between the two approaches. 
 
A first difference concerns the termination point that Fine envisages for his 
decomposition of macroscopic material objects into parts. He points out that the 
embodiment account has the consequence that most material objects will have a 
“largely unique” “hierarchical division” into immediate parts, with their own 
immediate parts, with their own immediate parts, “and so on all the way down 
until we reach the most basic forms of matter” (1999, p. 72). Put the other way 
around, he envisages rigid and variable embodiment as providing modes of 
composition by which macroscopic material objects may be constructed from the 
most basic forms of matter, by which I assume he means microscopic units of 
matter, fundamental particles without parts, at least of the kind involved in rigid 
and variable embodiment. 
 
According to (NCV), on the other hand, all forms of grounding terminate in NCs, 
which are a privileged set of the macroscopic material objects with which we are 
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familiar from our basic perceptual encounters with the world around us. Plural 
temporal partition and plural role collection certainly provide a means by which 
material objects may be grounded upon smaller parts, as assemblages of such 
things; but grounding by these means always terminates, in the direction of 
decreasing size, in NCs. (NCV) also envisages material objects that are 
themselves smaller parts of NCs. In special cases these may be NCs in their own 
right, such as certain organs and the teeth of animals, and the fruit and leaves of 
certain plants. The general case, though, is that these are AC parts grounded on 
the initial NCs by spatial partition. Again, the fundamental grounds are in every 
case NCs. 
 
This raises the question how (NCV) is supposed to articulate the relationship 
between NCs themselves and the fundamental particles of physical theory that 
Fine apparently takes to be basic in his hierarchy of embodiment. An attractive 
answer is to adopt Jones’ (2015) Multiple Constitution approach. In the current 
setting, the proposal would be that NCs relate constitutionally to determinate 
pluralities of such particles one-many. No such plurality uniquely constitutes any 
NC. A multiplicity of pluralities are all equally eligible in that role. Put slightly 
differently, it is a mistake to think of the unity of NCs as traceable down to their 
simple constitution by any given plurality of microscopic particles. Their 
existence supervenes upon what is present at the level of fundamental physics; 
but there is no identification of an individual NC at any time as a composite, 
however complex and nested this may be, of a particular collection of particles. 
NCs owe their autonomous unity instead to their role in larger scale 
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commonsense explanations of coarser-grained phenomena. Yet are no less real 
for that. 10 
 
Jones himself advances the Multiple Constitution picture as a powerful solution 
to the Problem of the Many (Unger, 1980). By insisting that distinct pluralities of 
particles may all equally constitute a single macroscopic material object, the 
pressure counterintuitively to admit that there must be many of the latter 
anywhere that we are inclined to acknowledge just one of them is simply 
defused. It seems to me in contrast that Fine’s embodiment account faces the 
Problem of the Many in its most threatening form, even in spite of his significant 
divergence from the standard mereological views that initially frame the 
Problem. For take a given macroscopic material object, such as Fine’s car, C. This 
is a variable embodiment at t, say, of an engine, E, and chasis, X, and a body, B. 
These are in turn variable embodiments at t of …, which are variable 
embodiments at t of fundamental physical particles, s1, …, sn. Now consider C*, 
the variable embodiment at t of p1, …, pn, under the same nested principles of 
hierarchical composition as govern the composition of C from s1, …, sn, where 
pi=si, i=1 - n-1, and pn is the closest distinct particle of the same kind as sn. Then 
C* is surely also a car: how could it fail to be one given such a miniscule 
difference with C. C* is distinct from C by Fine’s own principles, although it is 
almost entirely overlapping with C. For the two have distinct parts: sn and not pn 
is a part of C and vice versa for C*. Iterating this line of thought leads to the 
                                                        
10 This kind of picture is perhaps more familiar in discussions of the mind-body 
problem and the relation between mental and physical properties. See my 
(1998) and especially Hornsby (1986) for explicit consideration of the parallels 
between its adoption there and in the case of the relation between macroscopic 
and microscopic objects that is my focus here. 
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presence of many distinct cars all in almost exactly the same place as C. Similarly 
for any macroscopic material object according to Fine’s account. This is the 
Problem of the Many. Now of course there are other potentially viable solutions 
on offer (perhaps the mot popular of these is Lewis (1993)); but I count it as at 
least a vice of Fine’s theory of embodiment that it is incompatible with Jones’ 
elegant Multiple Constitution view that strikes me as the most promising 
solution available. 
 
The second difference that I wish to consider follows from the first given an 
important point of agreement between Fine and the proponent of (NCV). The 
point of agreement is that embodiment and grounding introduce a conceptual 
element into the unity of the material objects concerned. Modelled precisely 
upon rigid and variable embodiments respectively, ACs grounded by plural 
temporal partition and plural role collection are unified in part respectively by 
conceptual relations, , and by functions,  from times to ACs on the basis of 
further conceptual roles, . The other forms of (NCV) grounding considered 
above all equally introduce conceptual elements into the unity of the ACs that 
they ground upon basic NCs. The difference between Fine’s theory of 
embodiment and (NCV) then follows from the fact just noted that, according to 
Fine, all macroscopic material objects are (multiply nested) embodiments of 
some kind. As he himself points out, (1999, p. 73), there is therefore an abstract 
conceptual element to the identity of all such material things. 
 
The central claim of (NCV), on the other hand, is that there is a basic class of 
macroscopic material objects, the NCs, that are wholly naturally unified, both at a 
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time and over time, entirely independent of our concepts and are therefore fully 
concrete in nature. The category of ACs grounded in the various ways outlined 
above upon such NCs certainly introduces material things whose unity is in part 
conceptual according to (NCV); but the NCs themselves are wholly concrete and 
entirely non-conceptually unified macroscopic material objects that are the basic 
grounds of all such things. 
 
Taking these two differences between (NCV) and Fine’s theory of embodiment 
together, it is a characteristic commitment of the former as against the latter that 
macroscopic material objects are not merely conceptually unified composites of 
specific determinate pluralities of fundamental particles, even by multiply nested 
rigid and variable embodiment. If we are to countenance the existence of wholly 
concrete such things, then there must be a basic class of macroscopic material 
objects whose reality and unity is autonomous rather than reductively 
compositional in this way and yet equally natural: not mere composites of 
fundamental particles. These are the basic objects that ground all other 
macroscopic material objects as elucidated above: the Enduring Exclusive 
Natural Continuants of (NCV). 
 
§7 A Principled Objection 
 
Opponents of (NCV) may suspect an objectionable degree of anthropocentrism in 
the view. Is it anything more than an illegitimate elevation to metaphysical 
theory of certain merely contingent idiosyncracies of human experience of and 
engagement with the material world around us? NCs would not appear to 
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significantly smaller or larger actual or merely possible perceivers of the very 
same world to have the privileged status that they merely seem to us to have 
from our peculiarly human perspective. So why should we assume that NCs 
actually do have any special status as basic Enduring and Exclusive objects 
grounding a system of macroscopic material things as elucidated above in a true 
metaphysics for that world? 
 
All I can do here to combat this concern is effectively to acknowledge its premise 
and to explain why its conclusion does not follow. The conclusion of the 
objection is that NCs do not have the privileged status assigned by (NCV) in a 
correct metaphysics for the material world. The premise is that our recognition 
of this status depends upon certain contingencies of our human perspective 
upon that world. The conclusion clearly does not follow. For knowledge in any 
domain depends upon possession of the capacities required to acquire it. 
Perhaps the premise is rather that material individuals entirely distinct from the 
NCs of (NCV) might equally appear to have the very same basic metaphysical 
status to actual or possible perceivers of a quite difference scale and constitution. 
Once again it is perfectly consistent with this quite plausible observation to deny 
the objector’s conclusion. For it is compatible with (NCV) to admit each of the 
following possibilities that all illustrate respects in which those appearances of 
differently scaled and constituted perceivers might be just as reliable in 
informing true metaphysical theory as (NCV) regards our own recognition of the 
basic status of NCs. First, some NCs may be proper parts of much larger NCs that 
we do not, and perhaps cannot, currently recognize as such, just as teeth and 
fruit are NC proper parts of NC animals and plants. Second, some NCs may, 
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perhaps, likewise have smaller NC proper parts than any that we currently 
recognize. Third, there may be significantly larger material individuals whose 
unity we are not currently in a position to discern that stand to NCs as NCs do to 
fundamental physical particles and that share the relatively autonomous reality 
and unity that NCs have in relation to fundamental particles in relation to NCs 
themselves. Fourth, there may even be further intermediate layers of similarly 
autonomous material individuals that share this Multiple Constitution relation of 
NCs to fundamental particles and to which NCs also stand in this same Multiple 
Constitution relation. 
 
(NCV) makes no claim that we currently do or ever could discern all that is 
metaphysically significant in the structure of the material world that we perceive 
and inhabit. It certainly denies absolutely that what is metaphysically real is in 
any way constrained or determined by our human perceptual and intellectual 
capacities. All that is supposed is that those capacities, well directed and 
judiciously applied, may enable us to discern at least some of the metaphysical 
structure that really obtains and are therefore essential to our acquisition of 
some metaphysical knowledge. We are in a position to identify and recognize as 
such a metaphysically significant category of basic macroscopic material objects: 
the NCs as (NCV) conceives of them. A metaphysics that failed to recognize such 
NCs and their status as basic grounds would be substantially lacking as an 
account of the nature of concrete material reality. 
 
§8 Conclusion 
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(NCV) recognizes a category of Enduring and Exclusive NCs, naturally unified, 
both at a time and over time, entirely independent of our concepts. These basic 
objects ground non-Enduring and non-Exclusive ACs by conceptual abstraction: 
spatial partition, temporal partition, role collection, plural temporal partition, 
plural role collection, and their repeated iteration. The position gains theoretical 
credit by its systematic explanation of cases of non-Endurance and non-
Exclusivity by the presence of ACs grounded on NCs, by its unified resolution of 
many familiar puzzle cases, and by its superior accommodation of key features of 
our intuitive conception of the concrete nature of macroscopic material objects 
in comparison to what is perhaps its closest competitor. 
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